Getting off lightly? The impact of the international financial crisis on the Middle East and North Africa by Brach, Juliane & Loewe, Markus
www.ssoar.info
Getting off lightly? The impact of the international
financial crisis on the Middle East and North Africa
Brach, Juliane; Loewe, Markus
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Brach, J., & Loewe, M. (2009). Getting off lightly? The impact of the international financial crisis on the Middle East
and North Africa. (GIGA Focus International Edition, 1). Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies -
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-274339
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Number 1
2009
ISSN 1862-3581
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
  E
D
IT
IO
N
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
Getting Off Lightly? The Impact of the 
International Financial Crisis on the 
Middle East and North Africa
Juliane Brach and Markus Loewe
The international financial crisis has hit the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), like other 
developing regions, unexpectedly, during a long phase of above-average growth. In contrast to 
other parts of the world, however, most MENA developing countries will able to get off lightly if 
the crisis does not last for too long. In Turkey and Israel, the region’s more industrialized coun-
tries, different initial conditions apply and the situation is not comparable to the Arab MENA 
countries. This is why both these countries are not included in the analysis below.
Analysis:
As is the case for other world regions, the crisis is impacting the MENA region mainly through 
two indirect effects: (i) a decline in the export of goods and services and (ii) a reduction in re-
mittances sent back home by migrant workers abroad. The more direct effects on the region’s 
financial markets matter to a much lesser extent. However, the Gulf countries in particular 
are also suffering from the wealth effect: substantial losses of capital invested abroad.
The non-oil-exporting countries of the region are not very vulnerable to the effects of the fi-
nancial crisis, partly because they are only weakly integrated into international trade and 
capital markets.
The energy exporters are being hit harder, especially because the oil price has fallen steeply. 
However, as long as the price does not continue to fall, most energy exporters will be able to 
survive the crisis for some time because they have been able to accumulate considerable fi-
nancial reserves during the boom years.
Dubai, Iraq, Iran and Yemen are the countries within the MENA region that have been most 
affected by the financial crisis. They do not have sufficient financial reserves to finance the 
gap between public spending and income from the sales of oil and gas.
Most countries in the region will probably be able to weather the financial crisis relatively 
well because of their comparatively limited openness towards global markets.
Nevertheless, the governments should use the financial crisis as an opportunity to implement 
market-oriented reforms and to find solutions to their structural problems. These countries 
urgently need to improve their productivity and competitiveness in order to reduce their de-
pendency on a limited number of export products and to create employment for a rapidly 
growing labor force. 
Keywords:	 global	financial	crisis,	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	crude	oil	and	energy	prices,	Arab	countries
This GIGA Focus was previously published in German as “Nur ein blaues Auge? Auswirkungen der internatio-
nalen Finanzkrise auf Nahost und Nordafrika,” GIGA Focus Nahost, No. 4/2009
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1. The Global Financial Crisis
The global financial crisis has hit the MENA re-
gion—like most other developing regions—during 
a long period of above-average economic growth. 
Between 2003 and 2008, the region’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew by almost 6 percent per year on 
average. This boom was due to a historically unique 
coincidence of three favorable economic conditions 
for the developing countries: easy and cheap access 
to capital, increasing commodity prices, and huge 
flows of remittances. The global financial crisis has 
reversed all of these conditions, bringing about dra-
matic consequences for many developing countries. 
The MENA region, however, might be lucky and 
“get off lightly” if the crisis does not last too long.
The catalyst for the financial crisis was the so-
called sub-prime	crisis in the United States. For many 
years, US banks had been selling barely secured 
mortgages to clients, even those with a rather ques-
tionable financial standing. Finally, at the end of 
2005, real estate prices began to stagnate and the first 
borrowers defaulted on their repayments. The rat-
ing agencies downgraded several mortgage banks, 
and as early as mid-2007 several institutes were in-
solvent. Their creditors also found themselves in dif-
ficulty, and faith in the US banking system eroded 
rapidly. Both domestic and foreign investors shifted 
their capital to less risky assets or withdrew it com-
pletely, meaning that the banks could no longer refi-
nance themselves. When Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy in September 2008, interbank lending 
collapsed globally.
At the beginning, it seemed as if the crisis would 
only affect the USA and perhaps Europe. By the 
fall of 2008 it had become clear, however, that de-
veloping countries would not be able to avoid the 
downward spiral. Four channels of contagion can be 
differentiated:
The	Wealth	 Effect: State and private players lost 
parts of their savings invested in industrialized 
and emerging economies.
The	Financial	Effect: In order to restore their liquid-
ity and avoid additional risks, investors from all 
over the world withdrew their capital from devel-
oping countries and canceled new investments. 
Furthermore, liquidity bottlenecks arose because 
banks worldwide limited the extension of new 
credit.
The	Real	 Economic	 Effect: Owing to the cooling 
down of the global economy, the demand for 
goods exported by developing countries has been 
•
•
•
shrinking, thus causing their external revenues to 
plummet.
The	Transfer	 Effect: Likewise, developing coun-
tries’ revenues from transfers such as remittances 
and development assistance have been decreas-
ing as well.
2. The Specifics of the MENA Region
The financial crisis struck the MENA region later and 
less vehemently than, for example, Latin America 
or East Asia. This fact is mainly due to three spe-
cific features of the region: First, most countries in 
the region are only weakly integrated into global 
trade and capital markets. Their reluctance to open 
their economies limited MENA countries’ growth 
rates during the boom, but now, during the time of 
crisis, is limiting the leverage of financial and real 
economic effects. Second, the MENA region pos-
sesses the largest crude oil and natural gas reserves 
worldwide. Also, some of the region’s countries had 
the opportunity to accumulate substantial financial 
reserves during the boom. Third, the region receives 
not only relatively large but also particularly stable 
flows of development aid—namely, from Europe 
and the United States.
3. The Effects of the Crisis on the MENA 
Countries
Like other world regions, MENA has been affected 
by the financial crisis through its real economic and 
transfer effects rather than its financial effect. In 
contrast to other developing countries, however, the 
wealth effect is also playing a noticeable role.
The importance of the four effects varies consid-
erably within the region:
The	energy	exporters	with	 large	proven	reserves	and	
smaller	 populations	 (Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and Saudi Arabia) are feel-
ing the real economic as well as the wealth ef-
fects. However, their oil and gas reserves are ex-
tremely large (especially in relation to the size of 
their populations) and their production costs low. 
These countries are able to finance their govern-
ment spending with the energy export revenues 
despite the currently low oil price. The consider-
able capital reserves that were accumulated dur-
ing the past boom years could help to smoothen 
any arising financial gaps.
•
•
-  -GIGA Focus International Edition 1/009
Energy	exporters	with	limited	reserves	or	large	popu-
lations	(Bahrain, Dubai, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen) are 
more vulnerable to the real economic effect of the 
crisis and also, partially, to the other three effects: 
Bahrain and Dubai are particularly suffering from 
the wealth and financial effects, while Iraq and 
Yemen have mainly been hit by the transfer ef-
fect. Within the MENA region, these countries are 
the most severely affected by the financial crisis 
because they are unable to keep their level of 
public spending at the current oil price without 
dissolving part of their financial reserves or even 
contracting debts. In particular, Iraq, Iran, and 
Yemen were not able to accumulate a significant 
amount of reserves during the boom.
The	energy-importing	countries (Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, the Palestinian Territories (PTs), and 
Tunisia) are suffering from a stagnation or decline 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as declin-
ing revenues from industrial exports, tourism, and 
remittances. At the same time, however, these 
countries are benefiting from low-price energy 
and food imports. As a result, with the exception 
of Tunisia and perhaps Morocco, the positive ef-
fects of the crisis might compensate for the nega-
tive effects—at least on the macroeconomic level.
The	net	energy	exporters	Egypt and Syria are spe-
cial cases since they export and import almost an 
equal amount of energy. The impact of the finan-
cial crisis will therefore most probably be modest 
in both countries.
3.1. The Wealth Effect
The wealth effect is being felt by some MENA 
countries much more than by any other part of the 
world. Before the crisis, only few other countries 
had achieved similar levels of foreign assets. For ex-
ample, foreign assets in Bahrain in 2007, measured 
in relation to GDP, excluding currency reserves, 
were equal to 13 times its GDP. Kuwait, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, Algeria, Oman, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Jordan, and Egypt also ranked very high on 
a global scale with regard to this criterion. The total 
sum that UAE sovereign funds had invested abroad 
by the end of 2007 was more than 300 percent of 
the country’s GDP. Similarly, the sovereign funds 
of Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Algeria had 
foreign assets that were equal to 142, 86, 64 and 34 
percent of GDP, respectively. In contrast, the foreign 
assets of Jordan, Lebanon, the PTs and Tunisia were 
almost exclusively owned by private investors.
•
•
•
Different estimates suggest that at least 30 per-
cent of these assets have been lost during the finan-
cial crisis. This means that the Arab sovereign funds 
and Arab private investors have lost approximately 
US$500 billion and US$300–500 billion, respectively. 
However, these losses are very unevenly distribut-
ed across the MENA region. The sovereign funds of 
Kuwait, Dubai and some others states have invest-
ed large shares of their capital into emerging mar-
ket stocks and bonds. As a consequence, they have 
experienced particularly large losses. At the same 
time, the sovereign funds of Algeria, Iran, Libya, and 
Saudi Arabia have followed a much more conserva-
tive investment strategy and have therefore fared 
much better. Severe losses have particularly been 
recorded among private investors from Lebanon, 
Jordan, and the PTs. Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco 
have not suffered large losses, simply because they 
do not hold significant amounts of foreign assets.
And yet, none of these countries is severely vul-
nerable to the wealth effect of the crisis. The loss-
es have predominantly occurred in countries and 
among stakeholders that are quite able to absorb 
them. Moreover, the wealth effect mainly concerns 
capital that has not been not invested into the na-
tional production process. Finally, there is quite a 
good chance that the losses can be recouped through 
future stock market gains.
3.2. The Financial Effect
Most MENA countries were initially affected by the 
financial crisis at a relatively late point in time and 
only to a limited extent. Even before the crisis the 
MENA region was not able to attract much invest-
ment from outside the region, and some evidence 
suggests that, with some exceptions such as Dubai, 
only limited sums of these investments have been 
withdrawn from the region. The stock markets in the 
region crashed just like those anywhere else, but the 
sales that led to the crash in the region were largely 
made by investors from within the region itself.
On average, MENA stock market indices have 
fallen by more than 50 percent from their peak in 
mid-2008, whereby between US$200 billion and 
US$600 billion have been lost. The losses have been 
particularly high in the oil-producing countries (with 
the exception of Iran), and Dubai has, by far, been 
hit the worst. The Egyptian stock market index has 
indeed also dropped by 54 percent from the level it 
had reached in January 2008. However, it had previ-
ously enjoyed a particularly sharp rise during 2007. 
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The stock markets in Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon 
have been less affected, and the Tunisian stock mar-
ket even bucked the international trend by growing 
by 11 percent during 2008.
The property markets of the MENA region have 
reacted in different ways. In some countries they 
have remained largely unaffected and, as in Oman, 
have only slowed down their dramatic growth. In 
Lebanon real estate prices are stagnating. Kuwait 
and Morocco are suffering a noticeable setback. 
Jordan and Syria are also both expecting a slow-
down in the next months. In the last few years, the 
return of guest workers from the Gulf, the influx of 
more than a million Iraqi refugees, plus land specu-
lation have resulted in overinvestment in property 
in these two countries. Once again, Dubai has been 
hit more than any other MENA country. Property 
prices have fallen on average by approximately 50 
percent and building projects worth US$582 billion 
have been put on hold. A large percentage of mi-
grant workers in the building sector have been laid 
off. By February 2009, as many as 17 percent of all in-
habitants had left the country, something which will 
probably cause the demand for residential property 
and real estate prices to sink further.
In stark contrast to most other countries, the 
banking systems of the MENA region have never 
been seriously threatened by the crisis. This is main-
ly due to the fact that MENA’s financial systems were 
and still are comparatively isolated from global mar-
kets. Most of them are still heavily regulated and 
some are still dominated by state-owned banks. In 
addition, most banks have easy access to domestic 
sources of finance. For example, in 2007 the deposits 
of the Egyptian banks exceeded their lending volume 
by more than 80 percent. Since then both dimensions, 
unaffected by the crisis, have continued to grow.
FDI has never been as important for the MENA 
region as it is in other developing regions (cf. Brach 
2008a). Any decrease in FDI flows is therefore much 
less dramatic than for other parts of the world. This 
is even true for Egypt, where inward FDI flows 
shrank by 44 percent during the second half of 
2008, mainly because Gulf investors were freezing 
planned investments.
MENA countries are even less exposed to de-
clines in other forms of investment because they 
constitute the only group of developing countries 
with a net outflow of interbank, intergovernmental, 
and portfolio investments. Any reduction in these 
categories of capital flows would therefore reduce 
the outflow of financial resources from the MENA 
region rather than the inflow.
In contrast, the fact that some MENA countries 
have been assigned significantly higher levels of risk 
by some of the leading international rating agencies 
is worrying. Higher risk ratings not only discourage 
potential investors but also raise the costs of bor-
rowing for both companies and governments. Most 
countries in the region have been able to improve or 
at least stabilize their rating since the beginning of 
2009. The ratings of Yemen, Morocco, and the UAE, 
however, have further worsened. In the case of the 
UAE, this is probably due to the particularly pre-
carious situation in Dubai, which is currently over-
shadowing the much less troubled situation in Abu 
Dhabi and the five smaller emirates.
The development of the exchange rates of MENA 
currencies in relation to the dollar and the euro pro-
vides additional evidence for the notion that the fi-
nancial effect of the global crisis has hit the MENA 
countries much less than most other parts of the 
world. Hardly any of the fixed, official rates have 
been revised, even during the most turbulent peri-
ods of the crisis. Only the Jordanian dinar has been 
appreciated once, in April 2008. The floating ex-
change rates of Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
fell sharply during the second half of 2008, but they 
have all recovered almost completely since then. 
3.3. The Real Economic Effect
The real economic effect has had a much greater sig-
nificance for the MENA region than the wealth or 
the financial effect. The energy exporters have been 
particularly affected, mainly because of the decline 
of the world market prices for oil and gas. Global 
demand for energy has only fallen by approxi-
mately 2 percent since the beginning of the crisis. 
Nevertheless, the price of oil has fallen by almost 
two-thirds from its all-time high in summer 2008 to 
little more than US$50 per barrel. As a result, some 
of the energy-exporting countries in the region have 
experienced a 25 percent reduction in their GDP due 
to losses in their export revenues. Libya and most of 
the Gulf countries have sufficient financial reserves 
to cope with this loss of income for a limited period 
of time. Even with the low current oil price, they re-
main able to finance their public expenditure from 
the proceeds of energy exports.
The situation is more problematic for Dubai, 
Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and Oman. These countries have 
to contract debts if they want to maintain their cur-
rent level of public spending. According to IMF es-
timations, Oman, Iran, and Iraq need an oil price of 
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US$77, US$90 and US$110, respectively, in order to 
finance their government budgets from their export 
income.
At the same time, the energy-importing countries 
in the region (Jordan, the PTs, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Lebanon) are benefiting from the low energy prices. 
They suffered badly from the high world market 
prices for energy during 2007 and 2008—not least 
because they heavily subsidize the prices of pet-
rol, fuel, gas, and electricity. Jordan, for example, at 
that time spent more than a third of its GDP on oil 
imports. These countries are now able to save 5–10 
percent of their GDP because they can import oil at 
a much lower price than in 2007.
Egypt, too, is benefiting rather than suffering 
from the decline in world energy prices although it 
is a net exporter of energy. It exports large quantities 
of natural gas on the basis of long-term contracts that 
were fixed well before the crisis. At the same time, 
Egypt depends on the import of oil and is therefore 
profiting from the current low price. Conversely, 
Egypt and the energy-importing MENA countries 
will have to bear losses in their income from the ex-
port of services (especially tourism and transport) 
and manufactured goods.
The revenues from tourism are expected to de-
cline. Consumers in higher-income countries have 
become much more prudent and economic in their 
spending because it is still unclear what additional 
effects the crisis might have in the future. Dubai, 
Morocco and Tunisia will probably suffer the most. 
In comparison to last year, Tunisia is seeing 25 per-
cent fewer reservations. The number of travelers to 
Egypt has also fallen—by approximately 30 percent 
between January 2008 and January 2009—but this 
might also be at least partly due to the Gaza conflict 
early this year keeping tourists from a holiday in 
Sharm-al-Sheikh or elsewhere on the Sinai. Jordan 
and Syria, however, are not as exposed to the global 
decline in tourism. These countries mainly attract 
cultural and religious rather than recreational tour-
ists; the former generally face fewer budget con-
straints and can afford to travel even in economi-
cally difficult times. For the same reason and due 
to an improved overall situation in the war-driven 
countries Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza Strip, tourism in 
Jordan and Syria is currently increasing, despite the 
economic crisis.
While Egypt is not suffering from a heavy de-
cline in tourism either, it is having to cope with large 
losses in the transport sector. Since the beginning of 
the financial crisis it has experienced a 25 percent 
drop in its revenues from the fees levied on ships for 
the use of the Suez Canal—equivalent to approxi-
mately 1 percent of GDP.
In general, the volume of goods exported from 
the MENA region, excluding fuel, is small and very 
much concentrated on a few countries. Only Tunisia 
and Jordan have non-energy exports worth more 
than 20 percent of their GDP. Because 45 percent 
of its exports are directed towards the EU, Tunisia 
is the MENA country that has been hit hardest by 
the global decline in the demand for manufactured 
goods. In particular, Tunisia’s turnover of textiles 
(-13 percent), automobile parts (-17 percent), leather 
goods (-20 percent), and olive oil (-38 percent) has 
been afflicted. Morocco and Syria have also seen 
a slight reduction in their leather exports. In addi-
tion, Morocco is expecting a 5–10 percent drop in 
revenues from agricultural products as well as a 78 
percent decrease in the export of phosphate. Egypt’s 
manufacturing exports, which grew by more than 
50 percent during 2008, will also decrease again in 
2009, by an estimated 25 percent. Jordan’s exports, 
on the other hand, have hardly been affected by the 
crisis at all.
3.4. The Transfer Effect
Iraq, Yemen, and Egypt are anticipating a particular 
decline in the volume of remittances because a con-
siderable number of their nationals are working in 
the rich oil-exporting Gulf countries and regularly 
sending money back home to their countries of ori-
gin. In Jordan and Lebanon, these remittances equal 
more than 20 percent of GDP; in Egypt, Yemen, and 
Tunisia they represent between 5 and 6 percent of 
GDP. If the oil price remains as low as it is now and 
the economic situation in the host countries worsens, 
a large number of the migrant workers might lose 
their jobs. Even those workers who stay will prob-
ably become more cautious about keeping their sav-
ings to themselves rather than transferring them to 
their relatives at home. In this case, remittances will 
decrease as they have often done during previous 
crises. It is estimated that 30,000 migrant workers 
have already returned back to Egypt. If, as predicted, 
some 5–10 percent of all migrant workers lose their 
jobs abroad, Egypt would lose revenues worth ap-
proximately 0.2–0.5 percent of its GDP. Remittances 
from the Gulf to Jordan, the PTs, and Lebanon are less 
likely to decline because migrant workers from these 
countries are employed primarily in the education 
and health sectors or in public administration rather 
than in the crisis-worn oil or construction sectors.
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Morocco and Tunisia also receive significant re-
mittances, most of which originate from migrant 
workers in Europe. These workers are also at risk 
of losing their jobs as a consequence of the financial 
crisis. However, the total number of workers return-
ing back from Europe to their countries of origin in 
the Maghreb will most probably remain small.
In general, the level of development assistance 
provided by Europe, the US and other donor coun-
tries is likely to decrease significantly because a 
lack of public support in times of crisis. The MENA 
countries, however, will probably not be affected 
much by any reduction in development aid because 
the support they receive is motivated by political 
and stability considerations rather than humanitar-
ian motives. In fact, it is hard to imagine that the vol-
ume of development cooperation with strategically 
important countries such as Jordan or Egypt would 
be reduced for mere budgetary reasons. At the very 
most, Yemen might face a limited reduction in the 
financial support it receives, which in any case only 
amounts to 1.5 percent of its GDP.
4. The Reactions of the MENA Countries to Date
Most MENA countries have taken immediate meas-
ures to deal with the financial crisis. With respect to 
the nature, volume, and main goals of these meas-
ures, two groups of countries can be differentiated.
As a first step, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, and 
the UAE have concentrated on state guarantees or 
guarantee funds in order to secure private bank de-
posits and to prevent the collapse of national bank-
ing institutes. Other MENA countries have focused 
instead on the real economic effect of the crisis and 
imposed emergency programs to cope with any 
possible drop in domestic demand. Morocco and 
Lebanon, for example, have established publicly 
funded credit schemes to safeguard the easy and 
cheap access of small and medium-sized entrepre-
neurs (SMEs) to credit. In addition, Morocco has set 
up a fund to reimburse some of the costs of adver-
tisements for Moroccan leather, textile, and electrical 
export products. The Lebanese government is plan-
ning to accelerate the realization of already approved 
infrastructure projects in order to create additional 
employment. Moreover, it has raised the salaries of 
public sector employees. The Tunisian government 
has made €10million available to support the tourism 
industry. Saudi Arabia has announced an infrastruc-
ture investment plan and has provided US$3 billion 
for interest-free loans to the needy. Kuwait has also 
established a fund to assist private enterprises when 
necessary, but has at the same time announced cuts 
in public expenditure on social services and infra-
structure. Moreover, many countries have lowered 
their key interest rates in order to ensure that the 
economy is sufficiently capitalized.
Despite the sharp drop in the oil price, the Or-
ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), to which the most important oil exporters 
in the MENA region belong, has cut oil production 
only very moderately. The production cut agreed 
upon by OPEC members in October 2008 was small-
er than expected, and a second reduction of crude 
oil production originally decided upon in December 
2008 was canceled altogether in March 2009. Saudi 
Arabia, in particular, has championed a low oil price 
as a contribution of oil-exporting countries to reviv-
ing the world economy. It has therefore opposed 
any further cuts in production quotas. According to 
the International Energy Authority (IEA), a low oil 
price—remaining at the current level for the whole 
of 2009—would have the same effect as if a US$3 bil-
lion stimulus package were to be adopted by the in-
dustrialized countries. The low oil price is relieving 
not only the industrialized and emerging economies 
but also the financial problems of the oil-importing 
developing countries and is therefore improving the 
chances of a rapid global economic recovery. 
Most oil-exporting nations are, for their part, able 
to temporarily cope with the low oil price until it 
rises again, likely in 2011 or 2012. Within the MENA 
region, only Iraq, Yemen, and Iran do not have suf-
ficient reserves to do so. The same is true, however, 
of several oil-exporting countries outside the MENA 
region, such as Russia and Venezuela. That OPEC 
has decided to support a low oil price against their 
interests is probably a result of Saudi Arabia’s opin-
ion leadership and its otherwise tense relations to 
these countries.
5. Prospects and Recommendations
In contrast to other developing countries, most 
MENA states will be able to weather the global fi-
nancial crisis without suffering any major damage. 
Almost all of them will continue to grow at posi-
tive though somewhat lower rates than before (for 
example, Saudi Arabia at 1 percent in 2009, Bahrain 
and Syria at almost 3 percent Egypt and Lebanon 
at approximately 4 percent and Qatar at even 8 per-
cent). Some countries will even benefit from the cri-
sis through a reduction of their inflation rates from 
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abnormally high to much more acceptable levels (for 
example, from 24 to 14 percent in Egypt, from 15 to 8 
percent in Syria, and from 7 to 3 percent in Tunisia).
The energy exporters can expect the demand 
for energy to soon exceed their production capac-
ity again. This will most certainly also push the oil 
price above its current level. Moreover, international 
stock market prices are expected to recover, so that 
some of the losses in foreign assets will be compen-
sated. Thus, even if the oil price should temporarily 
slip under the critical mark of US$50 again, the con-
sequences will not be devastating for the majority 
of oil exporters in the MENA region, since most of 
them possess sufficient financial reserves and ben-
efit from sound fundamental macroeconomic data. 
Nevertheless, they should take the current crisis as 
a further occasion to cut unnecessary government 
expenditure and to consider strategies for diversify-
ing the range of their export goods.
Iran is the main exception in this regard. It had 
accumulated quite substantial financial reserves by 
2004, but had already used up the bulk of these 
well before the crisis started in order to finance sev-
eral programs for the poor established by President 
Ahmadinejad. In addition, unlike Dubai, Iraq, or 
Yemen, Iran faces difficulties in borrowing on the in-
ternational financial markets because of the effects 
of the US embargo. The government can neither 
increase taxes nor increase the printing of money 
in order to contain its budget deficit because there 
have already been numerous protests by the Iranian 
people against both strategies and because inflation 
and unemployment already stand at 30 percent and 
20 percent, respectively. The government will prob-
ably have to restrict imports, as it already did twice 
in the 1980s and the 1990s. Whatever happens, the 
country is going to be further politically destabi-
lized by the crisis and could even suffer from some 
loss of influence within the region if the crisis lasts 
longer than expected.
Similarly, Dubai could also suffer from a decline 
in importance, since it is currently unable to cope 
with its liquidity problems without the substantial 
support of its sister emirate Abu Dhabi. This might 
increase the pressure on Dubai to accept a UAE un-
der the single leadership of Abu Dhabi, replacing 
the joint leadership of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
Finally, the low oil price also constitutes a prob-
lem for Yemen. The country’s national budget deficit 
has already grown to 9 percent of its GDP, and its 
foreign debt amounts to 28 percent of its GDP. In 
contrast, Egypt, Syria, and most of the energy im-
porters in the MENA region will be able to master 
the global crisis quite well. The low energy prices 
have provided them with an extra financial buffer 
which is allowing them to withstand for some time 
the effects of losses in export revenues without hav-
ing to accrue new debt.
In the short term, these countries should react 
to the crisis by ensuring that companies and house-
holds alike have easy access to market-price credit. 
In addition, they should support unemployed and 
impoverished households by, for example, estab-
lishing or extending public works (cash-for-works) 
programs. Their medium- to long-term priority, how- 
ever, should be to continue their search for solutions 
to their structural problems. First, they should phase 
out food and energy subsidies before the prices of 
these commodities rise again. To compensate for 
this step, the countries could build up a basic social 
protection system (for example, a cash-for-education 
program), which would allow them to react quickly 
and flexibly with additional financial assistance for 
the needy in the event of external shocks, like the 
current financial crisis, in the future. Second, energy 
importers should—like energy exporters—improve 
their ability to innovate in order to reduce their de-
pendence on a limited number of export goods and 
to make better use of greater integration in world 
markets, especially in the technology sector (cf. 
Brach 2008b).
One dilemma is that many MENA countries 
have coped well with the financial crisis partially 
because so far they have hardly opened themselves 
to world markets. This encourages internal oppo-
nents to reform and provides them with new ar-
guments against market-oriented reforms. Thus, 
structural adjustment reforms could become even 
more difficult to implement than before the crisis. 
Nevertheless, they are essential to eliminating the 
dependency of MENA countries on just a few export 
goods, to strengthening their competitiveness in 
global markets, to creating jobs for a rapidly grow-
ing labor force, and to coming to grips with the rap-
idly growing public spending of the governments.
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